Proclus: Metaphysical Elements (Part 2)

PROPOSITION CXXXVI.

Every God who is more universal and ranks nearer to the First, is participated by a more universal genus of beings. But the God who is more partial and more remote from the First, is participated by a more partial genus of be­ings. And as being is related to being, so is unity to di­vine unity.⁵⁷

For if there are as many beings as there are unities, and vice versa, and one unity is participated by one be­ing, it is evident that the order of beings proceeds ac­cording to the order of the unities, being assimilated to the order prior to beings: and more universal beings are connascent with more universal unities, but more partial beings with more partial unities. For if this were not the case, again similars would be conjoined with dissimilars, and there would not be a distribution according to worth. These things, however, are impos­sible: since from the divine unities the one and appro­priate measure shines forth, and proceeds from them to all other natures. Much more, therefore, will there be an order of participation in these, similars depending on similars, according to power.

PROPOSITION CXXXVII.

Every unity with the one constitutes the being which partic­ipates of it.

For The One, since it constitutes all things, so likewise it is the cause of the unities which are participated, and of the beings which depend on these unities. But the unity of every being produces the peculiarity which shines forth in that particular being. And The One in­deed is the cause of being simply; but unity is the [103] cause of alliance, because it is connascent with The One. Hence unity is that which of itself defines the being which participates of it, and essentially exhibits in it­self a superessential peculiarity or characteristic. For everywhere, from that which is primary that which is secondary is that which it is. If, therefore, there is a certain superessential peculiarity of deity, this likewise belongs to the being which participates of it essentially.

PROPOSITION CXXXVIII.

Of all the deified natures which participate of the divine peculiarity, the first and highest is Being itself.

For if being is beyond intellect and life, as has been demonstrated, and if it is likewise after The One the cause of the greatest number of effects, being will be the highest deified nature. For it is more unical than life and intellect, and is on this account entirely more venerable. But there is no other prior to it except The One. For prior to unical multitude what else can there be than The One? But being is unical multi­tude, because it consists of bound and infinity. And, uni­versally, superessential being is prior to essence:⁵⁸ since in the illuminations which are imparted to secondary natures, The One alone is beyond Being itself, being im­mediately after The One. For that which is being in capacity (power), but is not yet being in energy (ac­tivity), is nevertheless according to its own nature one: and after this follows the being which is now being in [104] energy. Hence in the principles of things non-being⁵⁹ is immediately beyond being, because it is something more excellent and no other than The One itself.⁶⁰

PROPOSITION CXXXIX.

All things which participate of the divine unities begin from being, but end, in a corporeal nature.

For being is the first of participants, but body the last: for we say that there are divine bodies. For the highest of all the genera of bodies, souls, and intellects are attributed to the Gods, so that in every order things analogous to the Gods may connect and preserve sec­ondary natures, and that each number may be a whole containing all things in itself, according to the whole which is in a part, and possessing prior to other things the divine peculiarity. The divine genus, therefore, subsists corporeally, psychically, and intellectually: and it is evident that all these are divine according to par­ticipation. For that which is primarily divine subsists in the unities. Hence the participants of the divine unities originate indeed from being, but end in a corpo­real nature.

PROPOSITION CXL.

All the powers of divine natures, having a supernal origin, and proceeding through appropriate media, extend even to the last of things and to the terrestrial regions.⁶¹

For neither does any thing intercept these powers, [105] and exclude their presence from all things. For they are not in want of places and intervals, on account of their unrestrained transcendency with respect to all things, and a presence every where unmingled. Nor is that which is adapted to participate of them, prohibited from participation. But as soon as any nature is pre­pared for participation they also are present, neither then approaching nor prior to this absent, but always possessing an invariable sameness of subsistence. If, therefore, any terrene nature is adapted to the participa­tion of these divine powers they are present with it, and fill all things with themselves: and with superior natures they are in a greater degree present, but they are present with the mediate natures according to their or­der, and with the natures which are last in an ultimate degree. From on high, therefore, they extend them­selves even to the last of things. Hence in last natures there are representations of those which are first, and all things sympathize with all;⁶² secondary indeed pre-existing [106] in primary natures, but primary natures pre­senting themselves to the view in those which are sec­ondary. For every thing subsists in a three-fold man­ner, either through cause, through hyparxis, or byparticipation.

PROPOSITION CXLI.

Every providence of the Gods is twofold, one exempt from the natures for which it provides, but the other co-ordinated with them.

For some divine essences, through their hyparxis and the peculiarity of their order, are entirely expanded above the illuminated natures. But others, which are of the same order, provide for things subordinate of the same co-ordination; these likewise imitating the provi­dential activity of the exempt Gods, and desiring to fill secondary natures with the good which they are able to impart.⁶³

PROPOSITION CXLII.

The Gods are present to all things in the same manner, but all things are not in the same manner present to the Gods. But every thing participates of their presence according to its own order and power. And this is accomplished by some things uniformly, but by others manifoldly; by some eternally, but by others according to time; and by some incorporeally, but by others corporeally.

For it is necessary that the different participation of the same things should become different either from the participant, or from that which is participated. But every divine nature always has the same order, and is free from any relation to all things, and is unmixed. It follows therefore that the mutation must arise and sub­sist from the participants, and that in these there is that which is not invariably the same, and that at different times they are differently present to the Gods. Hence though the Gods are present to all things with invariable sameness, all things are not in the same manner present to them. But other things are present to them to the extent of their capacity, and according to the manner in which they are present they enjoy their illuminations. For the participation of the Gods is according to the measure of their presence.

PROPOSITION CXLIII.

All inferior natures yield to the presence of the Gods, though the participant may be adapted to participation. Every thing alien recedes from the divine light, but all things are illuminated at once by the Gods.

For divine natures are always more comprehensive and more powerful than the things which proceed from them. But the inaptitude of the participants is the cause of the deprivation of divine illumination: for this inaptitude obscures it by its own imbecility. And [108] this being obscured, a certain other appears to receive dominion, not according to its own power, but accord­ing to the imbecility of the participant, which seems to rise against the divine form of the illumination.

PROPOSITION CXLIV.

All beings, and all the distributions of beings, extend as far in their progressions as the orders of the Gods.

For the Gods produce beings with themselves, nor is it possible for any thing to subsist, and to receive measure and order external to the Gods; for all things are perfected, disposed, and measured by the power of the Gods. Prior therefore to the last genera in beings the Gods preexist, who likewise adorn these genera, and impart to them life, form and perfection, and convert them to The Good. In a similar manner, likewise, the Gods are prior to the middle and first genera of beings: and all things are bound and rooted in the Gods, and through this cause are preserved. But when any thing aposta­tizes from and becomes destitute of the Gods, it entirely departs into non-entity and vanishes, because it is wholly deprived of those natures by which it was contained.

PROPOSITION CXLV.

The peculiarity of every divine order pervades through all secondary natures, and imparts itself to all the subor­dinate genera of beings.

For if beings proceed as far as the orders of the Gods extend, in every genus of beings there is a supernally-illuminated peculiarity of the divine powers. For every thing receives from its proximate appropriate cause the peculiarity according to which that cause is allotted its hypostasis. I say, for instance, if there is a certain purifying deity, there is likewise a purification in souls, in animals, in plants, and in stones. And, in a [109] similar manner, if there is a guardian, a convertive, a perfective, and a vivific power. And a stone indeed par­ticipates of the divine purifying power corporeally only; but a plant participates it more clearly, through life. An animal has this form according to impulse or desire: the rational soul, rationally; intellect, intellectually; and the Gods superessentially and unically. The whole causal chain likewise has the same power from one divine cause. And there is the same mode of reasoning with respect to the peculiarities of the other divine powers. For all things depend on the Gods. And different na­tures are illuminated by different Gods; every divine causal chain extending even to the last of things. And some things indeed depend on the Gods immediately, but others through a greater or less number of media. Truly, all things are full of Gods: and whatever each thing naturally has, it receives from the Gods.⁶⁴

PROPOSITION CXLVI.

The ends of all the divine progressions are assimilated to their principles, preserving a circle without a beginning and without an end, through the return of all to their principles.⁶⁵

For if every thing which has proceeded returns to its own principle from which it proceeded, much more will universal orders having proceeded from their summit again return to it. But the return of the end to the be­ginning renders the whole order one, definite, and tending to itself, and exhibiting through this tendency or inclination to itself the uniform which is in the mul­titude.

PROPOSITION CXLVII.

The summits of all the divine orders are assimilated to the ends of the natures which are proximately above them.

For if it is necessary that there should be a con­tinuity of the divine progression, and that each order should be bound together by appropriate media, it is necessary that the summits of secondary should be con­joined with the ends of primary orders. But this con­tact becomes through similitude. Hence there will be a similitude of the principles of an inferior to the ends of a proximately superior order.

PROPOSITION CXLVIII.

Every divine order is united to itself in a threefold manner, viz. by the summit which is in it, by its middle, and by its end.

For the summit having a power which is most unical transmits union to all the causal chain, and unites the whole of it, supernally abiding in itself. But the middle, extending to both extremes, 'binds together the whole order about itself; transmitting indeed the gifts of primary divine natures, but extending the powers of those which are last and inserting communion in all of [111] them, and a conjunction with each other. For thus the whole order becomes one from natures which replenish and those that are filled, converging to the middle as to a certain center. And the end again returning to the beginning, and recalling the proceeding powers, imparts similitude and convergency to the whole order. And thus the whole order is one through the unific power of primary natures, through the connexion existing in the middle, and through the return of the end to the prin­ciple of the progressions.

PROPOSITION CXLIX.

Every multitude of the divine unities is bounded by number.

For if it is most proximate to The One it will not be infinite: for the infinite is not connascent with The One, but alien to it. Indeed, if multitude of itself or essentially departs from The One, it is evident that infi­nite multitude is perfectly destitute of it. Hence it is powerless, and inefficacious. The multitude of the Gods therefore is not infinite. Hence it is uniform and finite, and is more finite than every other multitude: for it is nearer to The One than all other multitude. If there­fore the principle of things was multitude, it would be necessary that every thing which is nearer to the prin­ciple should be a greater multitude than that which is more remote from it: for that which is nearer to any thing is more similar to it. Since, however, that which is first is The One, the multitude which is conjoined with it is a less multitude than that which is more remote from it. But the infinite is not a less, but the greatest possible multitude.

PROPOSITION CL.

Every nature which proceeds in the divine orders is not nat­urally adapted to receive all the powers of its producing cause. Nor in brief are secondary natures able to receive all the powers of the natures prior to themselves, but these have certain powers exempt from things in an inferior order, and incomprehensible by the beings posterior to themselves.⁶⁶

For if the peculiarities or characteristics of the Gods differ from each other, those of the subordinate preexist in the superior divinities; but those of the su­perior, since they are more universal, are not in the su­bordinate. But more excellent natures impart indeed some powers to their progeny, but antecedently assume others in themselves, in an exempt manner. For it has been demonstrated that those Gods who are nearer to The One are more universal; and those more remote from it more partial. But if the more universal have powers comprehensive of the more partial, those that have a secondary and more partial order will not com­prehend the power of the more universal Gods. In the superior therefore there is something incomprehensible and uncircumscribed by the inferior orders: for each of the divine orders is truly infinite. Nor is that which is infinite, as has been demonstrated, infinite to itself, nor much less to things above itself, but to all the natures posterior to itself: but infinity in these last is in capacity, or power. The infinite, however, is incomprehensible by those natures to which it is infinite. Subordinate natures, therefore, do not participate of all the powers which more excellent natures antecedently comprehend in themselves: for the latter are incomprehensible by [113] the former. Hence things of a secondary nature, through their more partial subsistence, will neither pos­sess all the powers of more excellent beings, nor will they possess the powers which they do contain in the same manner as superior natures, on account of that infinity through which the latter transcend the former.

PROPOSITION CLI.

Every paternal order or genus in the Gods is primary, and pre-exists in the rank of The Good, according to all the divine orders.

For the paternal genus produces the hyparxes of secondary natures, and total powers and essences, through one ineffable transcendency. Hence likewise it is denominated paternal, by reason of exhibiting the united and boniform power of The One, and the cause which constitutes secondary natures. And in each or­der of the Gods the paternal genus ranks as the leader, producing all things from itself, and adorning them, be­cause it is arranged analogous to The Good. And of the divine fathers some are more universal, but others are more partial, just as the orders themselves of the Gods differ according to a more universal or particular nature, through a causal reason. As many therefore as are the universal progressions of the Gods, so many likewise are the differences of the fathers. For if there is that which is analogous to The Good in every order, it is necessary that there should be a paternal genus in all the orders, and that each order should proceed from the paternal union.⁶⁷

PROPOSITION CLII.

Every thing which is generative in the Gods proceeds ac­cording to the infinity of divine power, multiplying itself, proceeding through all things, and transcendently exhibiting a never-failing power in the progressions of secondary natures.

For to multiply things which proceed, and to pro­duce things into progeny from the occult comprehen­sion in causes, of what else is it the prerogative than of the infinite power of the Gods, through which all divine natures are filled with prolific good? For every thing which is full produces other things from itself through a super-plenary power. The domination of power therefore is the peculiarity of generative deity, which multiplies the powers of the things generated, renders them prolific, and excites them to generate and consti­tute other things. For if every nature imparts the ap­propriate peculiarity which it has primarily to other things, every nature which is prolific will impart to na­tures posterior to itself a prolific progression, and will adumbrate the infinity which is the primary leader of wholes, from which every generative power proceeds, and which in an exempt manner pours forth the peren­nial progressions of divine natures.

PROPOSITION CLIII.

Every thing perfect in the Gods is the cause of divine perfection.

For as the hypostases of beings are of one kind, but those of superessential natures of another, so likewise of perfections — those of the Gods themselves are in their hyparxis, but those of beings are secondary and posterior to them. And the former are self-perfect and primary, because The Good subsists primarily in them; but the latter possess perfection through participation. [115] Hence the perfection of the Gods is one thing, and that of deified natures is another. The perfection however which is primarily in the Gods is not only the cause of perfection to deified natures, but likewise to the Gods themselves. For if every nature so far as it is perfect returns to its own principle, that which is the cause of all divine return is the perfective genus of the Gods.

PROPOSITION CLIV.

Every thing which is of a guardian nature in the Gods pre­serves every thing in its proper order, and is uniformly exempt from secondary and established, in primary na­tures.

For if a guard immutably preserves the measure of the order of every thing, and connectedly contains all the natures which are guarded in their appropriate per­fection, it will impart to all things an excellence supe­rior to subordinate beings, and will firmly establish each thing unmingled in itself, existing as the cause of undefiled purity to the natures which are guarded, and fixing them in superior beings. For every thing is perfect which adheres to primary natures, is in itself alone, and is expanded above all things subordinate.

PROPOSITION CLV.

Every thing vivific in the Gods is a generative cause, but every generative cause is not vivific.

For a generative is more universal than a vivific cause, and is nearer to the principle of all things. For generation manifests a cause which produces beings into multitude: but vivification represents to us the deity who is the supplier of all life. If therefore the former multiplies the hypostases of beings, but the latter the progressions of life, — if this be the case, as being is to life so is the generative order to the vivific causal chain. Hence the former will be more universal and the cause [116] of a greater number of effects, and therefore will be nearer to the principle of all things.

PROPOSITION CLVI.

Every cause of purity is contained in the guardian order: but on the contrary every genus of a guardian order is not the same with the purifying genus.

For purity imparts to all the Gods the unmingled with things inferior, and the undefiled in the providence of secondary natures. But a guardian power likewise effects this, contains all things in itself, and firmly in­serts them in superior natures. The guardian therefore is more universal than the purifying genus. For, in brief, the peculiarity of the guardian power is to pre­serve the order of every thing the same with reference to itself, and to the natures prior and posterior to itself: but the peculiarity of purity is to keep more excellent natures exempt from those which are subordinate. These powers however are primarily in the Gods. For it is necessary that there should be one cause preceding that which is in all things, and, in brief, that there should be uniform measures of all good causally com­prehended by the Gods. For there is no good in sec­ondary natures which does not pre-exist in the Gods: for what other origin or cause can this have? Hence in the divinities purity is likewise a primary good, guardi­anship, and every thing of this kind.

PROPOSITION CLVII.

Every paternal cause is the supplier of being to all things, and constitutes the hyparxes of beings. But every nature which is fabricative of the production of form exists prior to composite natures, and precedes their order and divi­sion according to number, and is likewise of the same co­ordination with the paternal cause in the more partial genera of things.

For each of these is of the order of bound; since [117] hyparxis, number and form have all of them the form of bound: so that in this respect they are co-ordi­nate with each other. But the demiurgic cause pro­duces fabrication into multitude; and the uniform sup­plies the progressions of beings. And the one is the artificer of form, but the other produces essence. So far therefore as form and being differ from each other, so far likewise does the paternal differ from the de­miurgic cause. But form is causal.⁶⁸ Hence the paternal cause is more universal and causal, and is beyond the demiurgic genus, in the same manner as being is be­yond form.

PROPOSITION CLVIII.

Every elevating cause in the Gods differs both from a purify­ing cause and from the revertive genera.

For it is evident that this cause has necessarily a primary subsistence in the Gods; since in these all the causes of total good pre-exist. But it subsists prior to the purifying cause: for the one liberates from things of a subordinate nature, but the other conjoins with more excellent natures. The elevating however has a more partial order than the revertive cause, because every na­ture which returns, returns either to itself, or to that which is more excellent than itself. But the work of the elevating cause is characterized by a return to that which is more excellent, because it leads that which re­turns to a superior and more divine cause.⁶⁹

PROPOSITION CLIX.

Every order of the Gods consists of the first principles, Bound, and Infinity. But one order is caused more by Bound, and another by Infinity.

For every order proceeds from each of these prin­ciples, because the impartances of first causes extend through all secondary natures. But in some things bound predominates in the mixture [of bound and infin­ity,] and in others infinity. And thus the genus which has the form of bound is perfected in which the powers of bound dominate: and so too the genus which has the form of the infinite is perfected in which the powers of infinity dominate.⁷⁰

On Intellect.

PROPOSITION CLX.

Every divine intellect is uniform, and perfect. And the first intellect is from itself, and produces other intellects.

For if it is a God it is filled with divine unities, and is uniform. But if this be so, it is likewise perfect, be­cause it is full of divine goodness. And if this be ad­mitted, it is likewise primarily intellect, since it is united to the Gods: for deified intellect is better than every intellect. But since it is primarily intellect, it likewise imparts an hypostasis to other intellects. For all sec­ondary natures receive their hyparxis from the primary natures.⁷¹

PROPOSITION CLXI.

Every thing which is truly being, and because it depends on the Gods, is divine and imparticipable.

For since that which is truly being is the first of the natures which participate of the divine union, as has been demonstrated, it likewise fills intellect from itself. For intellect is being, because it is fill­ed with being, and true being is therefore a divine intelligible: as that which is deified it is divine, but as that which fills intellect, and is participated by it, it is intelligible. Intellect likewise is being through that which is primarily being. But that which is primari­ly being itself is separate from intellect, because in­tellect is posterior to being. But imparticipables sub­sist prior to things which are participated: hence being which subsists by itself and is imparticipable is prior to the being which is conjoined with intellect. For it is intelligible, not as co-arranged with intellect, but as perfecting intellect in an exempt manner, because it im­parts being to it, and fills it with truly existing essence.

PROPOSITION CLXII.

Every multitude of unities which illuminates truly exist­ing being is arcane and intelligible; arcane since it is conjoined with The One, but intelligible because it is par­ticipated by being.

For all the Gods are denominated from the things which depend on them; because from these it is possi­ble to know their different hypostases, which are [of themselves] unknown. For every thing divine is of it­self ineffable and unknown, because it is connascent with the Ineffable One.⁷² From the difference, however, [120] of the participants it happens that the peculiarities of divine natures become known. The Gods, therefore, which illuminate truly existing being are intelligible; be­cause true being is a divine intelligible, and imparticipable, subsisting prior to intellect. For this would not depend on the first Gods, unless they likewise possessed a primary hypostasis, and a power perfective of other Gods, — since, as participants are to each other, so like­wise are the hyparxes of the things which are partici­pated.

PROPOSITION CLXIII.

Every multitude of unities which is participated by imparticipable intellect is intellectual.

For as intellect is to truly existing being, so are these unities to the intelligible unities. If, therefore, the latter which illuminate being are intelligible, hence the former which illuminate a divine and imparticipable in­tellect are intellectual. Yet they are not intellectual in such a way as if they subsisted in intellect, but as caus­ally existing prior to intellect, and generating intellect.

PROPOSITION CLXIV.

Every multitude of unities which is participated by every imparticipable soul is supermundane.

For because imparticipable soul is primarily above the world, the Gods also which are participated by it are likewise supermundane, having the same analogy or proportion to the intellectual and intelligible Gods which soul has to intellect, and intellect to truly exist­ing being. As, therefore, every soul depends on intel­lect, and intellect returns to the intelligible, thus like­wise the supermundane are dependent on the intellectual, [121] in the same manner as the intellectual on the intel­ligible Gods.⁷³

PROPOSITION CLXV.

Every multitude of unities which is participated by a certain sensible body is mundane.

For it illuminates the parts of the world through the medium or intervening of intellect and soul.⁷⁴ For neither is intellect present to any mundane body with­out soul, nor are deity and soul conjoined immediately, because participations and conjunctions become through similars. Intellect itself likewise according to its intel­ligible and summit participates of unity. Unities, there­fore, are mundane, because they give completion to the whole world, and deify visible bodies. For each of these is divine, not through soul, for soul is not pri­marily a God, — nor through intellect, since intellect is not the same with The One. But each of these visible bodies is animated, indeed, and moved of itself, through soul: and it possesses a perpetual sameness of subsistence, and is moved in the most excellent order through intellect: but it is divine through union. And if it possesses a providential power, it possesses it through this cause.

PROPOSITION CLXVI.

Every intellect is either imparticipable or participable. And if participable, it is either participated by supermun­dane or by mundane souls.

For imparticipable intellect, having a primary hyparxis, [122] is the leader of every multitude of intellects. But of participable intellects some illuminate the super-mundane and imparticipable soul, but others the mun­dane soul. For the mundane multitude does not im­mediately emanate from the imparticipable, if progres­sions become through similars. But that which is sep­arate from the world is more similar to the impartic­ipable than that which is divided about it. Nor does a supermundane multitude alone exist, but there are likewise mundane multitudes; since there is a mun­dane multitude of Gods, and the world itself is animated and at the same time intellectual. The participation likewise of the supermundane Gods by mundane souls, is through the medium of mundane intellects.

PROPOSITION CLXVII.

Every intellect thinks itself: but the Primal Intellect thinks itself only, and in this intellect Thought and the object of thought (the intelligible) are one numerically. But each of the subsequent intellects thinks itself and the natures prior to itself. And the intelligible to each of these is partly that which it is (itself) and partly that from which it ema­nates.

For every intellect either thinks itself, or that which is above itself, or that which is posterior to itself. But if it thinks that which is posterior to itself, since it is intellect, it will turn to that which is less excellent than itself; and thus will not know that to which it turns, because the object of its thought is not in itself, but external to itself: and it will only know the image of this thing, which was generated in itself from it. For that which it has it knows, and that which it experi­ences, but not that which it does not possess, and by which it is not affected.

But if it thinks that which is above itself, if indeed this is done through the knowledge of itself, it will at [123] one and the same time both know itself and that super­ior nature. But if it knows that alone it will be ig­norant of itself, even though it is intellect. In brief, by knowing that which is prior to itself, it will know that it is a cause, and will likewise know the things of which it is the cause. For if it is ignorant of these, it will likewise be ignorant of that which is the cause of them, not knowing that which produces what it produces by its very being, and what the things are which it does produce. Hence by knowing the things of which the nature which is superior to it is the cause, it will like­wise know itself, because it emanates from thence. By knowing, therefore, that which is prior to itself, it will likewise entirely know itself. Hence if there is a cer­tain intelligible intellect, this knowing itself will likewise know the intelligible, since it is itself the intelligible. But each of the intellects which are subsequent to the First will think the intelligible which is in itself, and at the same time that which is prior to itself. Hence the intelligible is in intellect, and intellect is in the intelligi­ble. But one intellect is the same with the intelligible; and another is the same with the thought which is in itself, but is not the same with the intelligible prior to itself.⁷⁵ For one is that which is simply intelligible, and another is the intelligible in that which thinks.

PROPOSITION CLXVIII.

Every intellect in activity knows that it thinks, and it is not the peculiarity of one intellect to think, and of another to know that it thinks.

For if it is intellect in activity, and thinks itself to be no other than the object of thought, it will know it­self, and see itself.⁷⁶ But seeing that which thinks, and knowing that which sees, it will know that it is intellect in activity. But knowing this, it will know that it thinks, and will not alone know the objects of its thinking. Hence it will simultaneously know the intelligible and that it thinks it, and by thinking itself it will know it­self.

PROPOSITION CLXIX.

Every intellect has its essence, power and action in eternity.

For if intellect thinks itself, and intellect and the intelligible are the same, thought likewise is the same as intellect and the intelligible. For, since thinking is the medium between that which thinks and the object of thought, and these are the same, thinking likewise will be the same with each. But that the essence of in­tellect is eternal is evident — for the whole of it subsists at once — and thinking is likewise eternal, since it is the same with the essence of intellect. For if intellect is immovable, it will not be measured by time, neither ac­cording to its being nor its activity: but since these sub­sist with invariable sameness, the power likewise of intellect will be eternal. [125]

PROPOSITION CLXX.

Every intellect thinks all things together. But imparticipable intellect thinks all things together simply: and each of the intellects subsequent to it thinks all things accord­ing to one or under the form, of the singular.

For if every intellect establishes its essence in eter­nity, and together with its essence its activity, it will think all things together: but to every nature which is not established in eternity the successive objects of its perception subsist according to parts or severally. For every thing which is successive is in time; the success­ive consisting of prior and posterior, but the whole of it not existing together. If therefore all intellects simi­larly think (know) all things, they will not differ from each other. For if they think all things similarly they are similarly all things, since they are the very things which they think. But if all intellects are similarly all things, one intellect will not be imparticipable and another not. For their essences are the same things as the objects of their thought; since the thinking of each intellect is the same with the being of each, and each is both thought and essence. It follows, therefore, either that each intellect does not similarly think all things, but one thing, or more than one, but not all things to­gether; or that it thinks (knows) all things according to one (under the form of the singular).⁷⁷ To assert how­ever that each intellect does not know all things, is to make intellect to be ignorant of some particular being. For if it is transitive in its activity, and thinks (knows) all things not together but according to prior and posterior, (i.e. knows one thing first and another subsequently), [126] at the same time having an immovable nature, it will be inferior to soul, which knows all things in and by activ­ity; because intellect on this hypothesis will only know one thing on account of its immovability. It will there­fore know all things according to one. For it either knows all things together, or one thing only, or all things ac­cording to one: for in all intellects there is always the thought or knowledge of all things, which bounds all things in one of all. Hence there is something dom­inant in thought, and the objects of thought; since all things are apprehended together as one only through the domination of one, which characterizes all things by itself.

PROPOSITION CLXXI.

Every intellect is an imparticipable essence.

For if it is without magnitude, incorporeal and immovable, it is impartible. For every thing which in any way whatsoever is partible, is either partible by reason of magnitude, or multitude, or of activities which function in time. But intellect is eternal in all things, and is beyond bodies, and the multitude which is in it is united. It is, therefore, impartible. That intellect likewise is incorporeal, the return to itself evidences: for no body re­turns to itself. But that it is eternal, the identity of its ac­tivity with its essence shows. For this has been before demonstrated. And that the multitude in it is united is evident from the continuity of intellectual multitude with the divine unities: for these are the first multitude, but intellects are next to these. Hence though every intellect is a multitude, yet it is an united multitude. For prior to that which is divided that which is collected into profound union, and is nearer to The One, subsists. [127]

PROPOSITION CLXXII.

Every intellect is proximately the producing cause of na­tures perpetual and immutable in essence.

For every nature which is produced by an immov­able cause, is immutable in essence. But immovable intellect being all things eternally, and abiding in eter­nity, produces by its very being that which it produces. If therefore intellect always is, and is invariably the same, it always produces, and in the same manner. Hence it is not the cause of things which at one time exist and at another time not, but it is the cause of things which always exist.

PROPOSITION CLXXIII.

Every intellect is intellectual, and the things which are prior and posterior to itself are likewise intellectual.

For the things which are posterior to itself are in­tellectual through cause, but the things which are prior to itself through participation: but intellect is the same, and is allotted an intellectual essence. Hence it de­fines all things according to its essence; both the things which are through cause, and those which are through participation. For every thing participates of more excel­lent beings in the way that it is naturally adapted to part­icipate, and not according to the subsistence of the more excellent: for otherwise they would be similarly participated by all things. Participations therefore are according to the peculiarity and power of the partici­pants. Hence in intellect the natures prior to it subsist intellectually; but intellect is likewise intellectually the things posterior to itself. For it does not consist of its effects, nor does it contain these but the causes of these in itself. But intellect is by its very being the cause of all things: and the very being of it is intellectual. Hence it contains intellectually the causes of all things, and [128] therefore every intellect contains all things intellect­ually, both those which are prior and those which are posterior to it. As therefore every intellect contains intelligibles intellectually, so likewise it contains sensibles intellectually.

PROPOSITION CLXXIV.

Every intellect constitutes the things posterior to itself by thinking, and its creation is in thinking, and its thought in creating.

For if intelligible and intellect are the same, the es­sence likewise of every intellect will be the same with the thinking in itself. But intellect does that which it does through its essence, and produces according to the very being which it is, and by thought therefore it will pro­duce the things which are produced. For in intellect being and thought are one. For intellect is the same with every being which it contains. If therefore it makes by its very being, but its very being is thought, it makes by thinking. The activity of thought consists in thinking, and this is the same with the essence of in­tellect, and the function of the essence of intellect is to produce. For that which produces immovably, always has its very being in producing; the thought of intellect therefore consists in producing.

PROPOSITION CLXXV.

Every intellect is primarily participated by those natures which are intellectual both in essence and in activity.

For it is necessary that every intellect should either be participated by those, or by other natures which have indeed an intellectual essence but do not al­ways think. It is however impossible that it should be participated by the latter. For the activity of intellect is immovable. And hence the natures by which it is [129] participated always participate of intellectual activity, which always causes the participants of it to become in­tellectual. For that which possesses its activity in a certain part of time is unadapted to be conjoined with an eternal activity. But as in essences so in the muta­tions and varieties of activities, between every eternal activity and that activity which is perfected in a certain time is that activity which has its perfection in the whole of time. For progressions never become with­out a medium, but through cognate and similar natures, according to the hypostases and perfections of energies. In a similar manner, therefore, every intellect is primar­ily participated by those beings which are able to think during the whole of time, and who always think, though their thinking is in time, and is not eternally in activity.

Corollary.— From this therefore it is evident that it is impossible for the soul which at one time thinks and at another does not to participate proximately of intellect.

PROPOSITION CLXXVI.

All intellectual forms are in each other, and, each is at the same time per se and distinct from the others.

For if every intellect is impartible, and the multi­tude which is in it is united through intellectual impartibility, all things in it will be in one, impartibles will be united to each other, and all intellectual forms will per­vade through all. But if all intellectual forms are im­material and incorporeal they are unconfused with each other and separate, and each preserving its own purity remains that which it is. The peculiar participation however of each participating in a separate man­ner manifests the unconfused nature of intellectual forms. For unless the forms which are participated were different and apart from each other, the participants [130] of each of them would not participate in a sepa­rate manner, but in the subordinate natures [i.e. in the participants] there would be a much greater indistinct confusion, because in rank they are inferior. For whence would there be a separation of these, if the natures which constitute and perfect them were con­fused and indistinguishable? But, further, the impart­ible hypostasis and uniform essence of that which con­tains forms evince their united nature: for things which have their hyparxis in the impartible and the uniform are impartibly in the same thing. For how can you divide the impartible and The One? Hence they are simultaneously existent, and are in each other, each wholly pervading through the whole of each, without in­terval. For that which comprehends them is not ex­tended with interval, nor is one of them in this thing, but another elsewhere, as in that which has interval, but every thing is together in the impartible and in one: so that all intellectual forms are in each other, and are in each other unitedly, and at the same time each is dis­tinctly apart from each.

Corollary.— But if any one, in addition to these demonstrations, needs examples, he may consider the theorems which exist in one soul. For all these are in the same soul, an essence which is truly without magni­tude, and are united to each other. For that which is without magnitude does not locally contain the things which are in it, but impartibly and without interval, and the natures which it contains are united and separated. For the soul of itself draws forth all the propositions, each apart from each, drawing nothing to itself from the rest which, unless they were always separated in habit, would not be separated by the action of the soul. [131]

PROPOSITION CLXXVII.

Every intellect being a plenitude of forms, one intellect con­tains more universal but another more partial forms. And the superior intellects contain more universally the things which those posterior to them contain more par­tially. But the inferior intellects contain more par­tially the things which those that are prior to them con­tain more universally.

For the superior intellects use greater powers, be­cause they are more unical than secondary intellects. But the inferior intellects, since they are more multi­plied, diminish the powers which they contain. For things which are more cognate to The One, because they are contracted in quantity are superior in power to the natures which are posterior to them. And, on the contrary, things more remote from The One because they are increased in quantity are inferior to the na­tures which are nearer to The One. Hence the supe­rior intellects, since they are essentially greater in power but less in multitude, through forms which are quanti­tatively less produce more effects; but the intellects pos­terior to them produce fewer effects through forms which are quantitatively more by reason of a deficiency in power. If therefore the former produce more effects through fewer forms, the forms in them are more uni­versal: and if the latter produce fewer effects through a greater number of forms, the forms in them are more partial.

Corollary.— Hence it happens that the natures which are generated from superior intellects through one form are produced divisibly from secondary intellects through many forms. And, again, those natures which are pro­duced by inferior intellects through many and distinct forms, are produced by superior intellects through [132] fewer but more universal forms. And that which is universal and common to all its participants accedes supernally: but that which is divided and peculiar accedes from secondary intellects. Hence secondary intellects by the more partial separation of forms distinctly unfold in a certain way and subtly differentiate the productions of primary intellects.

PROPOSITION CLXXVIII.

Every intellectual form constitutes eternal natures.

For if every intellectual form is eternal and immov­able, it is essentially the cause of immutable and eternal hypostases, but not of those which become and are cor­ruptible: so that every thing which subsists by reason of an intellectual form is an eternal intellectual nature. For if all forms produce things posterior to themselves by their very being, but their being has an invariable sameness of subsistence, the things produced by them will likewise be invariably the same, and will be eternal. Neither therefore do the genera which are only in time subsist from a formal cause, nor have corruptible na­tures as such a pre-existent intellectual form. For they would be incorruptible and unbegotten, if they de­rived their hypostasis from intellectual forms.

PROPOSITION CLXXIX.

Every intellectual number is finite.

For if there is another multitude posterior to this, essentially inferior to it, and thus more remote from The One, but the intellectual number is nearer to The One, and if that which is nearer to The One, is quanti­tatively less, but that which is more remote from it is quantitatively more, — if this be the case, the intellectual number likewise will be less than every multitude pos­terior to it. Hence it is not infinite. The multitude [133] of intellects therefore is finite. For that which is less than a certain thing is not infinite, because the in­finite so far as it is infinite is not less than any thing.⁷⁸

PROPOSITION CLXXX.

Every intellect is a whole, because each consists of parts, and is at once united to other intellects and differentiated from them. But imparticipable intellect is a whole sim­ply, since it has in itself all the parts totally or under the form of the whole; but each partial intellect contains the whole as in apart, and thus is all things partially.

For if a partial intellect is all things according to one, and a subsistence according to one is nothing else than a subsistence partially, the whole is in each of these intellects partially, being defined according to a certain one particular thing which dominates in all of them.

PROPOSITION CLXXXI.

Every participated, intellect is either divine because it depends on the Gods, or is intellectual only.

For if there is a divine and imparticipable intellect primarily, the intellect which is cognate to this is not that which differs from it in both respects, viz. which is neither divine nor imparticipable, For things which are dissimilar in both these respects cannot be conjoined to each other. It is evident therefore that the me­dium between these is partly similar to that which is primarily intellect, and partly dissimilar to it. Either, therefore, it is imparticipable and not divine; or it is par­ticipated and divine. But every nature imparticipable is divine, because it is allotted an order in multitude analogous to The One. Hence there will be a certain [134] Intellect which is divine and at the same time participat­ed. It is necessary however that there should be an intellect which does not participate of the divine unities, but thinks them only. For in each causal chain the things which are first, and which are conjoined with their monad, are able to participate of the things which are proximately in a superior order: but those which are far distant from the primary monad cannot depend on the natures that proximately belong to a higher or­der. There is therefore both a divine intellect and an intellect which is intellectual only: one subsisting according to an intellectual peculiarity which it has from its own monad, and from imparticipable intellect; but the other subsisting according to the union which it receives from the participated monad.

PROPOSITION CLXXXII.

Every divine participated intellect is participated by divine souls.

For if participation assimilates the participant to that which is participated, and renders the former connascent with the latter, it is evident that the participant of a divine intellect must be a divine soul, and depend­ent on a divine intellect, and that through intellect as a medium it must participate of the deity which it con­tains. For deity conjoins the soul which participates of it with intellect, and binds the divine to the divine.

PROPOSITION CLXXXIII.

Every intellect which is participated indeed, but is intellec­tual alone is participated neither by divine souls nor by those which experience a mutation from intellect into a privation of intellect.

For neither are divine souls of this kind, nor those which participate of intellect. For souls participate of the Gods through intellect, as has been demonstrated, [135] Nor are souls which admit of mutation of this kind. For every intellect is participated by natures which are al­ways intellectual, both in essence and in activity. And this is evident from what has previously been proven.

On Soul.

PROPOSITION CLXXXIV.

Every soul is either divine, or is that which changes from in­tellect into a privation of intellect, or that which always remains as a medium between these, but is inferior to di­vine souls.

For if divine intellect indeed is participated by di­vine souls, but that intellect which is intellectual alone by those souls which are neither divine, nor receive a mutation from intelligence into a privation of intellect, — for there are souls of this kind which at one time think and at another do not, — if this be the case, it is evident that there are three genera of souls. And the first of these are divine; but the second are not divine, yet al­ways participate of intellect; and the third are those which at one time change into intellect, and at an­other into a privation of intellect.

PROPOSITION CLXXXV.

All divine souls are Gods psychically. But all those which participate of an intellectual intellect are the perpetual attendants of the Gods. And all those which are the re­cipients of mutation are only occasionally the attendants of the Gods.

For if upon some souls the divine light supernally shines, but others always think, and others again only occasionally participate of this perfection, — if this be the case, the first of these among the multitude of souls will be analogous to the Gods: and the second will always [136] follow the Gods, by reason of always energizing according to intellect, and will depend on divine souls, having the same relation or proportion to them as that which is intellectual to that which is divine. And the souls which only occasionally energize intellectually and follow the Gods neither participate of intellect in a man­ner always the same, nor are always able to return [to the intelligible] in conjunction with divine souls. For that which only occasionally participates of intellect, can in no way whatsoever be always conjoined with the Gods.⁷⁹

PROPOSITION CLXXXVI.

Every soul is an incorporeal essence and separable from the body.

For if it knows itself, but every thing which knows [137] itself returns to itself, and that which returns to itself is neither body, since every body is incapable of returning to itself, nor is inseparable from body, since that which is inseparable from body is not naturally adapted to revert to itself as it would thereby be separated from body, — hence every soul is neither a corporeal essence, nor inseparable from body. But that the soul knows itself is evident. For if it knows the natures which are above itself, and is naturally able to know it­self, much more will it know itself through the causes prior to itself.⁸⁰

PROPOSITION CLXXXVII.

Every soul is indestructible and incorruptible.

For every thing which can in any way whatso­ever be dissolved and destroyed is either corporeal and composite, or is allotted its hypostasis in a subject. And that indeed which is dissolved is corrupted because it consists of a multitude of divisible parts: and that of which it is the nature to exist in another vanishes into non-entity when separated from its subject. But the soul is incorporeal and external to every subject, sub­sisting in itself, and returning to itself. Hence it is indestructible and incorruptible.⁸¹

PROPOSITION CLXXXVIII.

Every soul is both life and vital.

For that to which soul accedes necessarily lives, and that which is deprived of soul at once becomes des­titute of life. Either therefore it lives through soul, or through something else, and not through soul. It is however impossible that it should live through some­thing else alone. For every thing which is participated either imparts itself, or something of itself, to its partic­ipant. But if it experiences neither of these, it will not be participated. Soul however is participated by that to which it is present, and that which participates of soul is said to be animated. If therefore that which is participated introduces life to animated natures it is either life, or vital alone, or both life and vital. If however soul is alone vital, but not likewise life, it will consist of life and non-life, and will not therefore know itself, nor return to itself. For knowledge is life, and the gnostic power so far as it is such is vital.⁸² If therefore there is any thing in soul without life, this will not possess essentially the power of knowing. But if soul is life alone it will no longer participate of the intellectual life. For the par­ticipant of life is vital and is not life alone, i.e., the first and imparticipable life; but the life which is posterior to this is both vital and life. Soul however is not im­participable life. And hence it is at the same time both life and vital.⁸³

PROPOSITION CLXXXIX.

Every soul is self-vital.

For if it is able to return to itself, but every thing which returns to itself is self-subsistent, the soul there­fore is self-subsistent, and constitutes itself. But it is likewise life and vital, and its hyparxis is in vitality. For the soul imparts life by its very being to the na­tures to which it is present. And if the participant is fit for participation it immediately becomes animated and vital; soul in effecting this not reasoning nor acting from deliberate choice, nor vivifying by cogitation and judgment, but by its very essence and by that which it is imparting life to the participant. Hence the being of soul is the same as to live. If therefore the soul pos­sesses being from itself and this is the same as to live, and it has life essentially, it will impart life to itself, and will possess it from itself. But if this be admitted, soul will be self-vital.

PROPOSITION CXC.

Every soul is a medium between impartible natures and the natures which are divisible about bodies.

For if soul is self-vital and self-subsistent, and has an hyparxis separable from bodies, it is exempt from and more excellent than all the natures which are divis­ible about body: for the corporeal natures are entirely inseparable from their subjects, because they are co-dis­tributed with divisible bulks, depart from themselves, and their own impartibility, and are co-extended with bodies. And though they subsist in lives, these are not the lives of themselves but of participants: and though they exist in essence and in forms, yet they are not the forms of themselves but of those things which are constituted by forms. If therefore soul is none of these, it is a self-subsistent essence, a self-vital life, and [140] a knowledge gnostic of itself. Hence, by reason of these characteristics, it is entirely separable from bodies, but is a participant of life; if this be so, it likewise partici­pates of essence. But it likewise participates of knowledge through other causes. It is evident there­fore that the soul is inferior to impartible natures, be­cause it is filled with life externally: and if with life, it is plain that it is likewise externally filled with essence. For prior to life and soul are imparticipable life and imparticipable essence. That soul however is not primarily gnostic is evident: since every soul so far as it is soul is life, but not every soul so far as it is soul has knowledge. For a certain soul while it remains soul is ignorant of [real] beings. Soul therefore is not primarily gnostic, nor does it possess knowledge from its very being. Hence it has an essence secondary to those natures which are primarily and by their very being gnostic. And since the essence of soul is divided from its knowledge, soul does not belong to natures [entirely] impartible. But it has been demonstrated that neither does it rank among the natures which are divisible about bodies. Hence it is a medium between the two.

PROPOSITION CXCI.

Every participable soul has an eternal essence, but its action is temporal.

For either it possesses each eternally, or each tem­porally; or the one eternally, but the other temporally. It cannot however possess each eternally: for it would be an impartible essence, and the nature of soul would in no respect differ from an intellectual hypostasis, viz. a self-motive from an immovable nature. Nor can it possess each temporally: for thus it would be generated only, and would neither be self-vital, nor self-subsistent. For nothing which is essentially measured by time is [141] self-subsistent: but soul is self-subsistent. For that which returns to itself through activity likewise essential­ly returns to itself, and proceeds from itself. It follows therefore that every soul is partly eternal, and partly participates of time. Either therefore it is essentially eternal, but participates of time through its action, or vice versa. The latter however is impossible. Hence every participable soul is allotted an eternal essence, but a temporal action or activity.

PROPOSITION CXCII.

Every participable soul ranks among the number of truly existing beings, and is the first of generated natures.

For if it is essentially eternal it is truly being through its hyparxis, and always is. For that which participates of eternity participates likewise of perpetual existence. But if it is in time according to action, it is generated. For every thing which participates of time, since it is always becoming to be, according to the prior and posterior of time, and is not at once that which it is, is wholly generated. But if every soul is in a certain respect generated through its action, it will be the first of generated natures. For that which is in every respect generated is more remote from eter­nal natures.

PROPOSITION CXCXIII.

Every soul subsists proximately from intellect.

For if it has an immutable and eternal essence, it proceeds from an immovable essence. For that which proceeds from a movable cause, is essentially changed in every respect. The cause therefore of every soul is immovable. But if it proximately sub­sists from intellect, it is perfected by and returns to in­tellect. And if it participates of the knowledge which [142] intellect imparts to the natures which are able to par­take of it — for all knowledge emanates from intellect to all natures in which it is, and all things have their progression essentially from that to which they naturally return — if this be the case, every soul pro­ceeds from intellect.

PROPOSITION CXCIV.

Every soul contains all the forms which intellect primarily possesses.

For if soul proceeds from intellect, and intellect constitutes it; and if intellect subsisting immovably pro­duces all things by its very being, it will likewise im­part to soul which it constitutes the essential reasons or productive principles of all things which it contains. For every thing which produces by its very being im­parts secondarily to the thing generated by it that which it is itself primarily. The soul therefore con­tains secondarily the representations of intellectual forms.⁸⁴

PROPOSITION CXCV.

Every soul is all things, containing sensibles paradigmatically, but intelligibles iconically.⁸⁵

For subsisting as a medium between impartible na­tures and those which are divisible about body, it pro­duces and constitutes the latter of these, but pre-estab­lishes in itself the causes from which it proceeds. Those [143] things, therefore, of which it is the pre-existent cause it antecedently comprehends paradigmatically or in their pre-formed models. But it has by participation, and as the progeny of first natures, the causes of its subsist­ence. Hence it antecedently comprehends according to cause all sensible natures, and contains the productive principles of material things immaterially, the principles of corporeal things incorporeally, and without interval the principles of things which are apart in space. But it contains intelligibles and the forms of them through images; so that it receives partibly the forms of those which are undivided, by multiplication the forms of those which are unical, and by self-motion the forms of things which are immovable. Hence the soul is all beings, containing those which are primary by partici­pation, but paradigmatically those which are posterior to its own nature.

PROPOSITION CXCVI.

Every participable soul primarily uses a perpetual body, which has an unbegotten and incorruptible hypostasis.⁸⁶

For if every soul is essentially eternal, and by its very being primarily animates some particular body, it will always animate this body: for the essence of soul is immutable. But if this be the case, that which is ani­mated by it is always animated, and always participates of the life of soul: and that which always lives by a much greater priority always exists. But that which always is, is perpetual. Hence that which is primarily attached to every soul is perpetual. But every participable soul is primarily participated by a certain body, since it is participable and not imparticipable, and animates its par­ticipant by its very being. Every participated soul therefore uses a body which is primarily perpetual, and [144] essentially unbegotten and incorruptible.

PROPOSITION CXCVII.

Every soul is an essence vital and gnostic, and, a life essen­tial and gnostic, and is knowledge, essence, and life. All these, the essential, the vital, and the gnostic, subsist in it together; and all are in all, and each is apart from the others.⁸⁷

For if it is the medium between impartible forms and those which are divided about bodies, it is neither so impartible as all intellectual natures, nor so partible as corporeal forms. Since, therefore, essences, lives and cognitions are divided in corporeal natures, these subsist in souls impartibly, unitedly, and incorporeally, and all of them exist together, through their immateri­ality and impartibility. Since, likewise, in intellectual natures all things subsist in union, they are distinguish­ed and divided in souls. All things, therefore, subsist together and at the same time apart in these. But if all impartibles subsist together and in one they pervade through each other, and if they are separate they are again divided without confusion; so that each subsists by itself, and all are in all. For in the essence of soul there are both life and knowledge; since every soul would not know itself, if the essence of it was of itself deprived of life and knowledge. And in the life of the soul there are both essence and knowledge: for life with­out essence and without knowledge belongs to material lives, which are neither able to know themselves, nor are genuine essences: and knowledge which is unessen­tial and without life does not of itself subsist. For all knowledge belongs to that which is vital, and which is of itself allotted an essence.

PROPOSITION CXCVIII.

Every nature which participates of time, and is always moved, is measured by circuits.

For since it is measured by time, the motion of it likewise participates of the measure and bound of time, and proceeds according to number: but because it is always moved, and this always is not eternal but tem­poral, it is necessary that it should use circuits. For motion is a mutation from some things to others. But beings are bounded by multitudes and magnitudes. These however being finite, there can neither be a mutation to infinity according to a right line, nor can that which is always moved make its transitions finitely. Hence that which is always moved will pro­ceed from the same to the same, and thus will proceed periodically.

PROPOSITION CXCIX.

Every mundane soul uses circuits of its proper life, and res­titutions to its pristine state.

For if it is measured by time, it acts transitively and has a peculiar motion. But every nature which is moved and participates of time, if it is perpetual uses circuits, periodically revolves, and proceeding from the same to the same is restored to its former state. And every mundane soul having motion, and energizing in time, will have circuits of motions, and restitutions to its pristine state. For every period of perpetual na­tures is apocatastatic or restorative to a former con­dition.⁸⁸

PROPOSITION CC.

Every circuit of soul is measured by time. The circuit of other souls is measured by a certain time, but the circuit of the first soul measured by time is measured by the whole of time.⁸⁹

For if all motions have prior and posterior, so likewise have circuits, and on this account they partici­pate of time. That also which measures all the cir­cuits of souls is time. But indeed if there were the same circuits of all souls, and they were about the same things, the time of all would be the same. If, how­ever, the restitutions of different souls are different, the periodic time likewise which is restorative to a pristine state is different in different souls.

That the soul, therefore, which is primarily mea­sured by time is measured by the whole of time, is evident. For if time is the measure of all motion, that which is primarily moved will participate of all time, and will be measured by the whole of time. For if the whole of time did not measure its first partici­pant, it would not measure anything else, according to the whole of itself. That all other souls however are measured by certain measures which are more partial than the whole of time, is evident from what has been demonstrated. For if these souls are more partial than the soul which primarily participates of time, neither can they adapt their circuits to the whole of time. But the multitude of their restitutions will be parts of the one circuit and restitution through which the soul that primarily participates of time returns to its pristine state. For a more partial participation belongs to an inferior power, but a more total to a greater power. Other souls, therefore, are not naturally adapted to [147] receive the whole temporal measure in one life, because they are allotted an order inferior to that of the soul which is primarily measured by time.

PROPOSITION CCI.

All divine souls have triple energies: one as souls, another as receiving a divine intellect, and another as attached to the Gods. And they provide for the whole of things as Gods, but know all things through an intellectual life, and move bodies through a self-motive essence.

For because they psychically participate of the na­tures which are superior to them, and are not simply souls but divine souls, and have an order in the psych­ical extent analogous to the Gods, they energize not only psychically but likewise divinely, being allotted a divine summit of their essence, and because they like­wise have an intellectual hypostasis, through which they are placed under intellectual essences. Hence they not only energize divinely, but likewise intellectu­ally: constituting one action according to the one which they contain, but the other according to intellect. A third action (activity) is present to them according to their own hyparxis, which is motive indeed of things naturally alter-motive, but is vivific of those which pos­sess an adventitious life. For this is the characteristic work of every soul; but the activities which are intel­lectual and providential they have through participation.

PROPOSITION CCII.

All souls attending upon and always following the Gods are inferior to divine, but are developed above partial souls.

For divine souls participate of intellect and deity, and hence are at the same time intellectual and divine, and the leaders of other souls, just as the Gods likewise are the leaders of all beings. But partial souls are deprived [148] of an attachment to intellect, because they are not able to participate proximately of an intellectual es­sence. Nor would they fall from intellectual energy, if they essentially participated of intellect, as has been demonstrated. Hence the souls which always follow the Gods are of a mediate condition: for though they receive a perfect intellect, and through this surpass par­tial souls, yet they are not attached to the divine unities. For the intellect which they participate is not divine.

PROPOSITION CCIII.

Of every psychical multitude, divine souls are greater in power than other souls, but less in number. But those which always follow divine souls have a mediate order among all souls, both in power end, quantity. And, par­tial souls are inferior in power to the others, but proceed into a greater number.

For divine souls are more allied to The One, on account of a divine hyparxis, but souls of a mediate rank through the participation of intellect, and those of the last order are essentially dissimilar to both those of the mediate and those of the first rank. Among per­petual natures, however, those which are nearer to The One are more single in number, and more contracted in multitude, than those which are more remote from it. But those which are more remote from The One are more multiplied. The powers therefore of superior souls are greater, and have the same ratio to those of souls in the second rank which the divine has to the intellectual, and the intellectual to the psychical peculiarity. And the quantities of inferior souls likewise are more in number. For that which is more remote from The One is a greater multitude and that which is nearer to it is a less multitude. [149]

PROPOSITION CCIV.

Every divine soul is a leader of many souls which always follow the Gods, and of a still greater number of those which occasionally receive this order.

For since it is divine it is necessary that it should be allotted an order which is the leader of all things, and which has a primary rank among souls. For in all beings that which is divine is the leader of wholes. It is likewise requisite that every divine soul should neither alone preside over the souls which perpetually follow the Gods, nor over those alone which are occasionally their attendants. For if any divine soul should alone pre­side over those which occasionally follow the Gods, how can there be a contact between these and a divine soul, since they are entirely different from it, and neither proximately participate of intellect, and much less of the Gods? But if it only presides over those which always follow the Gods, how is it that the causal chain proceeds as far as to these [alone]? For thus in­tellectual natures would be the last, and unprolific, and unadapted to perfect and elevate. It is necessary, there­fore, that the souls which follow the Gods, and ener­gize through intellect, and which are elevated to intel­lects more partial than divine intellects, should primar­ily depend on every divine soul: and that second to these it is necessary that there should be the partial souls, which through the divine souls as media are able to participate of intellect and a divine life. For through those which always participate of a superior condition those which only occasionally participate of it are per­fected. And again it is necessary that about every di­vine soul there should be more souls which only occa­sionally follow the Gods than those which always attend on them. For the power of the monad always pro­ceeds into multitude, through diminution; deficient in [150] power, but redundant in number. And every soul like­wise of those which always follow the Gods is the leader of a multitude of partial souls, imitating in this a divine soul; and elevates many souls to the primary monad of the whole causal chain. Every divine soul, therefore, is the leader of many souls which always fol­low the Gods, but presides over a still greater number of those which only occasionally receive this order.

PROPOSITION CCV.

Every partial soul has the same ratio to the soul under which it is essentially arranged, as the vehicle of the one has to the vehicle of the other.

For if the distribution of vehicles to all souls is ac­cording to nature, it is necessary that the vehicle of ev­ery partial soul should have the same ratio to the ve­hicle of the soul which ranks as a whole, as the essence of the one has to the essence of the other. The dis­tribution, however, is according to nature. For the things which primarily participate are spontaneously conjoined with the natures which they participate. If, therefore, as a divine soul is to a divine body, so like­wise is a partial soul to a partial body, each soul essen­tially participating, — therefore that which was first as­serted is true, that the vehicles of souls have the same ratio to each other, as the souls themselves of which they are the vehicles.⁹⁰

PROPOSITION CCVI.

Every partial soul is able to descend infinitely into genera­tion, and to reascend from generation to real being.⁹¹

For if it at one time follows the Gods, but at an­other falls from the striving upwards to the divine nature [and an abiding with it], and participates alike of intellect and the privation of intellect, it is evident that it is al­ternatively conversant with generation and the Gods. For since it is not for an infinite time with the Gods, it will not for the whole of the succeeding time be con­versant with bodies. For that which has no temporal beginning will never have an end, and that which has [153] no end is necessarily without a beginning. It follows, therefore, that every partial soul makes circuits of as­cents from and of descents into generation, and that this must be unceasing through infinite time. Every partial soul, therefore, is able to descend and reascend infinitely. And this experience all souls must undergo.⁹²

PROPOSITION CCVII.

The vehicle of every partial soul is fabricated by an immov­able cause.

For if it is perpetually and connascently attached to the soul which uses it, and by cognation is immutable in essence, it is allotted its hypostasis from an immov­able cause. For every thing which is generated from movable causes is essentially changed. Moreover, ev­ery soul has a perpetual body, which primarily partici­pates of it. Hence the cause of a partial soul, and therefore of its vehicle, is immovable, and on this ac­count supermundane.

PROPOSITION CCVIII.

The vehicle of every partial soul is immaterial, essentially indivisible, and impassive.

For if it proceeds from an immovable fabrication, [154] and is perpetual, it will have an immaterial and impas­sive hypostasis. For the things which are naturally pas­sive in essence are all mutable and material, and because they subsist differently at different times are attached to movable causes. Hence, likewise, they receive an all-vari­ous mutation, since they are moved in conjunction with their principal causes. But that the vehicle of every partial soul is indivisible, is manifest. For every thing which is divided, so far as it is divided is corrupted, because it departs from the whole, and from its continuity. If, therefore, the vehicle is essentially immutable and impassive, it will be indivisible.⁹³

PROPOSITION CCIX.

The vehicle of every partial soul descends indeed with the addition of more material vestments, but becomes united to the soul by an ablation of every thin£ material, and a re­currence to its proper form, analogous to the soul which uses it.⁹⁴

For the soul indeed descends irrationally, assuming irrational lives; but it ascends, laying aside all the gen­eration-producing powers, with which it was invested in its descent, and becoming pure returns to the pris­tine condition of its nature. For the vehicle imitates the lives of the souls which use it, and since they are every where moved it is moved in conjunction with them. By its circulations it likewise represents the in­tellections of some souls, but the falling of others through their inclinations into generation, and the pur­ifications of others through the circumductions which lead to an immaterial nature. For because it is vivified by the very essence of souls, and is connascent with them, it is ail-variously changed in conjunction with their energies; follows them every where, becomes co-passive with them, is restored to its pristine state to­gether with them when they are purified, and is ele­vated when they are elevated, and desires its own per­fection. For every thing is perfected when it obtains its proper perfection.

PROPOSITION CCX.

Every connascent vehicle of the soul always has the same figure and magnitude. But it appears to be greater and less and of a dissimilar figure through the additions and ablations of other bodies.

For if it derives its essence from an immovable cause, it is evident that both its figure and its magni­tude are defined by this cause, and each is immutable and invariable. But at different times it appears to be different, as likewise greater and less. Hence through other bodies, added from the material elements, and again taken away, it exhibits a different appearance both in quantity and form.

PROPOSITION CCXI.

Every partial soul descending into generation descends as a whole; nor does one part of it remain on high, and an­other part descend.

For if part of the soul remains in the Intelligible World it will always think, either without transition, or by a transitive process. But if without transition it will be pure intellect and not a part of the soul, and the par­tial soul will directly participate of intellect. This how­ever is impossible.⁹⁵ But if it thinks by a transitive process, then out of that which always thinks and that which occasionally thinks one essence will be formed. This however is likewise impossible. For these al­ways differ, as has been demonstrated. Moreover, it is ab­surd to suppose that the highest part of the soul which is ever perfect does not rule over the other powers, and cause them to be perfect. Every partial soul, therefore, descends as a whole.⁹⁶

Additional Notes and Elucidative Excerpts.

I.

P. 20. The truth of this may be exemplified in light. Thus for instance we may see many species of light; one kind emanating from the sun, another from fire and the stars, another from the moon, and another from the eyes of many animals. But this light though various is everywhere similar, and discovers in its oper­ations a unity of nature. On account of its uniformity, therefore, it requires one principle and not different principles. But the sun is the only principle of all mun­dane light: and though there are many participants of light posterior to the solar orb, yet they scatter their uniform light through one solar nature, property and power. But if we again seek for the principle of light in the sun, we cannot say that the solar orb is the prin­ciple; for the various parts of it diffuse many illumina­tions. There will therefore be many principles. But we now require one first principle of light. And if we say that the soul of the sun generates light, we must ob­serve that this is not effected by her psychical multi­plicity, or she would diffuse different lights. Hence we must assert that she generates visible by intellectual light. But again this production does not subsist through intellectual variety, but rather through the unity of in­tellect which is its flower and summit. This unity is a symbol of that simple unity which is the principle of the universe. And to this principle the solar intellect is united by its unity, and through this it becomes a God. This divine unity of the sun therefore is the principle of the uniform light of the world, in the same manner as simple unity and goodness is the source of intelligible light to all intelligible natures. —T.

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II.

P. 40. The truth of this reasoning may be evinced by the following considerations. Every thing which is measured by time, and such is every corporeal nature, depends on time for the perfection of its being. But time is composed of the past, present, and future. And if we conceive that any one of these parts is taken away from the nature with which it is connected, that nature must immediately perish. Time therefore is so essentially and intimately united with the natures which it measures that their being such as it is depends on the existence of time. But time, as it is evident, is perpetually flowing, and this in the most rapid manner imagination can conceive. It is evident therefore that the natures to which it is essential must subsist in a manner equally transitory and flowing; since, unless they flowed in conjunction with time, they would be separated from it, and would consequently perish. Hence as we cannot affirm with propriety of any part of time that it is — since even before we can form the as­sertion the present time is no more—so, with respect to all corporeal natures, from their subsistence in time, before we can say they exist they lose all identity of being.

Such then is the unreal condition of every thing ex­isting in time, or of every thing corporeal and entangled with matter. But this shadowy essence of body is finely unfolded by Plotinus, in the 6th. book of his 3rd. Ennead, as follows: "Being properly so called is neither body, nor is subject to corporeal affections; but body and its properties belong to the region of non-entity. But you will ask, how is it possible that visible matter should possess no real being; that matter in which stones and mountains reside, the solid earth, and bodies, which mutually resist, — since bodies, which impel [161] each other, confess by their collision the reality of their existence? You will likewise ask, in what manner things which neither strike against nor re­sist each other, which neither externally act nor in­ternally suffer, nor are in any respect the objects of sight, viz. soul and intellect, are to be reckoned true and real beings? We reply, that on the contrary things more corpulent are more sluggish and inert, as is evi­dent in bulky masses of earth. But whatever is less ponderous is more movable, and the more elevated the more movable. Hence fire, the most movable of all the elements, flies as it were from a corporeal nature. Moreover, as it appears to me, whatever is more suffi­cient to itself disturbs others less and brings less incon­venience; but such things as are more ponderous and terrene, unable from their defect of being to raise them­selves on high, and becoming debile and languid, strike and oppress surrounding bodies by their falling ruin and sluggish weight. Since it is evident that bodies destitute of life fall with molestation on any proximate substance, and more vehemently impel and pain what­ever is endued with sense. On the contrary animated beings, participating more of entity, by how much the more of being they possess by so much the more harm­less they impinge their neighboring bodies. Hence motion, which is a kind of life or soul, or an imita­tion of life in bodies, is more present to whatever is less corpulent; as if more of body was necessarily produced, where a defect of being happens in a greater degree. Again, it will more manifestly appear from passiv­ity that whatever is more corpulent is more passive, — earth in a greater degree than the other elements, and the rest in a similar proportion. For some things when divided suddenly return to their former union, when no [162] obstacle prevents their conjunction. But from the sec­tion of a terrene body the divided portions always re­main separate, as if destitute of natural vigor, and with­out any inherent desire of union and consent. Hence they are ready by every trifling impulse to remain as they are impelled; to rush from the embraces of bound, and hasten into multitude and non-entity. So that whatever becomes corporeal in an eminent degree, as falling fast into non-entity, has but little power of re­calling itself into one. And on this account ponderous and vehement concussions are attended with ruin, when by mutual rushing one thing impels another. But when debility runs against debility, the one is valid against the other, in the same manner as non-entity rushing on non-entity. And this we think a sufficient refutation of their opinion who only place being in the genus of body, persuaded by the testimony of impulses and concussions, and the phantasms perceived through the senses, which testify that sense is the only standard of truth. Such as these are affected in a manner similar to those in a dream, who imagine that the percep­tions of sleep are true. For sense is alone the employ­ment of the dormant soul; since as much of the soul as is merged in body so much of it sleeps. But a true ele­vation and a true vigilance are a resurrection from and not with the dull mass of body. For a resurrection with body indeed is only a transmigration from sleep to sleep, and from dream to dream, like a man passing in the dark from bed to bed. But that elevation is per­fectly true, which entirely rises from the dead weight of bodies. For these, possessing a nature repugnant to soul, possess something opposite to essence. And this is further evident from their generation, and their continual flowing and decay, which are properties en­tirely foreign from the nature of being substantial and real." -T.

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III.

P. 84. To such as understand these Elements this argument for the existence of a multitude of Gods is per­fectly demonstrative and clear. Indeed as every produc­tion of nature possesses the power of generating its similar, it is much more necessary that the First Cause of all should generate a multitude the most similar to "him­self that can possibly be conceived. For every being produces that which is similar prior to the dissimilar; as indeed a contrary mode of proceeding would be absurd and impossible. The immediate or first productions therefore of the First God must be a multitude of Gods — or otherwise his first progeny would not be per­fectly similar to himself. Nor does this doctrine in any respect derogate from the dignity of the Supreme God, as the ignorant suppose, but on the contrary tends to exalt his majesty and evince the ineffable be­neficence and perfection of his nature. For though it establishes a multitude of Gods, yet it teaches that they are dependent on the First, who is perfectly incompre­hensible and without participation. So that it leads us to consider the subordinate Deities as so many lesser luminaries shining before the presence of the Sun of good, and encircling with awful grandeur his ineffable radiance and occult retreats. And that this doctrine fully displays his superlative goodness is sufficiently manifest, since by a contrary assertion we must ascribe imperfection to the fountain of excellence, and leave Deity impotent and barren. —T.

I rejoice in the opportunity which is afforded me of presenting the truly philosophic reader, in the pres­ent work, with a treasure of Grecian theology; of a theology which was first mystically and symbolically promulgated by Orpheus, afterwards disseminated enig­matically through images by Pythagoras, and in the [164] last place scientifically unfolded by Plato and his gen­uine disciples. The peculiarity, indeed, of this theology is, that it is no less scientific than sublime; and that by a geometrical series of reasoning, originating from the most self-evident truths, it develops all the deified pro­gressions from the Ineffable